Hurricane Katrina expert sees more ill winds blowing

Thursday, August 10 2006, 12:05 AM EDT

Contributed by: Robert Krier

EYE ON THE STORM
EYE ON THE STORM
Ivor van Heerden, deputy director of the Louisiana State University Hurricane Center, has studied the geography of southeast Louisiana for decades. Long before last summer, he told state, local and federal officials that New Orleans would be vulnerable to a direct-hit hurricane. Much of what he feared would happen came true when Katrina struck in August.

The state of Louisiana later named the LSU Hurricane Center to lead an investigation of Katrina levee failures. Van Heerden heads a team of engineers and coastal scientists who are analyzing storm-surge levels and levee construction.

In his book, "The Storm" (Viking, $25.95), van Heerden and co-author Mike Bryan detail the many mistakes made before and after Katrina that contributed to the devastation. Van Heerden fears the nation will be forced to endure many similar disasters unless drastic changes are made and government officials begin to heed scientists' warnings.

We reached van Heerden a few days before he testified at a field briefing for the U.S. House Committee on Science, where the rebuilding of the levee system and coastal restoration issues were discussed.

QUESTION: What's the most widespread misperception about Katrina and its aftermath that you would like to dispel?

ANSWER: That it "was their own fault" - the misconception by certain right-wing politicians and media that what happened during Katrina was the fault of those who live in New Orleans. These folk, U.S. citizens and taxpayers, depended upon the security of the federally designed and built hurricane levees, which failed them so dismally.

Q: As you say in the book, despite the dire warnings beforehand, Katrina wasn't the big one. In essence, it was a category 1 hurricane, based on wind damage at the surface, when it hit New Orleans. What would have happened if it had been a category 5?

A: A category 5 would sink all of New Orleans and most of southeast Louisiana. In fact, a slow-moving category 3 tracking just west of the city would totally sink New Orleans.

Q: You lay the blame for the flooding at the feet of the Army Corps of Engineers, which was charged after Hurricane Betsy in 1965 with building a complete system to protect the city from a category 4 hurricane. You say the corps failed to live up to its responsibility because it tried to build the levees on the cheap.

A: The main interest of the New Orleans district of the corps is (or perhaps was) the navigation industry - dredging and maintenance of canals, building and maintenance of locks and other port facilities. These multimillion-dollar projects are supported by a very efficient lobbying effort in Washington, D.C. It kind of works like this: Folk retire from the corps and then set up (or work for) companies that consult for the corps; these companies then spend large sums of money lobbying for projects for the corps. As I show in my book, the $711 million proposed lock on the Industrial Canal is one such boondoggle.

No one was really lobbying for the levees. They were not as financially rewarding or sexy as navigation projects.

Q: Your research shows that 87 percent of the water that flooded New Orleans was a result of levee failures, with many deaths due to breaches in the London Avenue and 17th Street canals. Was the corps negligent in not following the design recommendations of the engineers and in discounting concerns about the soil quality?

A: The corps was very negligent.

Q: You support federal compensation for the people who lost their homes and livelihoods because these people trusted their lives to the government's levee system. Is that compensation even remotely possible?

A: At this point in time, the federal government and the White House are only just starting to acknowledge their culpability. Unless the American public becomes vocal about this issue, these unfortunate Katrina survivors who lost so much will continue to feel that they are the victims of government mistakes and deserted, in their hour of need, by the nation.

Q: In February, when your book was published, you thought that at least some of the levees would not be as strong as they were pre-Katrina come the 2006 hurricane season. Do you still hold that view?

A: One-hundred-sixty-nine miles of the 350 miles of levees around New Orleans failed during Katrina. Many more miles would have failed if the breaches did not occur where they did. Basically, once a levee breaches, the pressure is removed or diminished on adjacent sections. There are levee sections that were weakened during Katrina that have not been strengthened. While the repairs have been robust, the rebuilt earthen levees along the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet canal, for instance, are still not armored. Another Katrina and the wind-wave field will once again destroy these levees.

Q: You write that if science and engineering are manipulated and censored, we might as well give up. What needs to change?

A: In order to ensure that the best science and engineering come to the fore, one needs to change the way of doing business. For instance, the planning needs to be done by the equivalent of the Tennessee Valley Authority, call it the Coastal Protection Authority, with direct connections to the best in academic and private company engineering and science. The "good ole boy" system, whether levees or coastal restoration, failed us; we need a totally new model.

Q: New Orleans' protective barrier islands will be completely gone in 10 to 15 years, you estimate. What has to be done?

A: Immense quantities of high-quality sands (shoals) exist in federal waters offshore. These shoals represent ancient drowned barrier islands systems. It would be relatively easy to mine the backs (landward sides) of these and use the material to rebuild the barrier islands.

Q: Re-establishing the barrier islands and wetlands and reinforcing the levee system would be enough to protect southeast Louisiana from a category 5 hurricane, you write. You'd think that would be enough to sell the program.

A: Selling the program is mostly about getting the White House on board. So far, they don't support large-scale coastal restoration. I don't know why; perhaps they see this as an "enviro" victory.

Q: You visited the Netherlands post-Katrina and were impressed with the Dutch's sophisticated flood-control system. Do you believe a similar system could be implemented here?

A: Southeast Louisiana's future is still up in the air. Whether we survive or not is a distinct unknown. The difference between the U.S. and the Netherlands is that it became a part of Dutch national honor to ensure there was no more catastrophic flooding. In the U.S. in 2006, we still have influential Republicans, including governors, who mock the New Orleans catastrophe. So go figure.

Q: You say that "without a radically revised attitude on the part of this administration and all subsequent administrations in Washington," we're doomed to repeat the catastrophe in Louisiana or elsewhere. What radical revisions do we need?

A: We have to learn to live with nature - we have to adopt sustainable development techniques. We need to see nature as our friend, not something that impedes our progress, slows our development or that only feeds our greed.

Q: Is global warming speeding up the need for quick action?

A: Global warming is the ax about to fall on all our heads. We need to heed the science and act accordingly, with positive quick action, or our denial will ensure that our kids and grandkids will eventually curse our generation.

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